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f 1efenctants/Respondents begin their presentation of 
1, .• c;uggesting that the Plaintiffs/Appellants nor either 
a cornoration nor a registered assumed 
On page 2, of the Defendants/Respondents brief, is the 
fullowing. 
The Plaintiff, Wilderness Building Systems, Inc., is 
not (emphasis original) a registered corporation, nor 
rs-it a rec;istered "d/b/a", let alone authorized to do 
business in the State of Utah . . 
If this were true, then the lower Court could have 
summarily disposed of this matter, pursuant to 42-2-10 of the 
Utah Code Annotated as amended in 1963, which states: 
42-2-10. Penalties. Any person or persons who shall 
carry on, conduct or transact any such business under 
an assumed name without having complied with the pro-
visions of this act shall not sue, prosecute or main-
tain any action, suit, counterclaim, cross complaint 
or proceeding of any of the courts of this state until 
the provisions of this chapter have been complied with. 
However, the Plaintiffs/Appellants are properly registered 
with the State of Utah, Secretary of State, and there was never any 
mention or allegation of the to the contrary, at any time 
Juring the lower court proceedings. 
At this point to suggest that the Plaintiffs/Appellants 
were not properly registered is merely an attempt to divert this 
l.c.·1n 's attention f'rorn the real issues of this case. Especially 
lr>c E. it was never raised before, when the same would have been 
1l1spnsitive before. 
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l'l1ere was no evidence to show that the Plaintiffs/ 
I 1 1,,1 · •.1ere not properly registered, consistent with the 
,, r that the Plaintiffs/Appellants were at all times 
/ lo this action, properly registered with the Sec-
,,.,;-"" 1•f State, for the State of Utah. 
ARGUMENT Tl•JO 
Defendants/Respondents suggest that there was a 
unilateral change on the costs of construction of the "pack-
aged home." 
On page 3 of their brief, they state: 
When the oral agreement was reduced to writ-
ing, the erection cost was unilaterally changed by 
Plaintiffs to $3,850.00 which was $1,350.00 more 
than the original price of $2,500.00 (See exhibits 
5-P and 17-1'). 
Plaintiffs/Appellants would think that the Defendants/ 
Respondents would be too ashamed to make such an assertion. 
According to the testimony of Charles Chapman both 
in his deposition and in Court, there were conversations about 
the costs for erecting the "packaged home" for some $2,500.00. 
As the negotiations continued, extras were included, and so 
nhen the matter was reduced to writing, the face amount on 
the contract was $3,850.00. 
Chapman signed the first part of the agreement, call-
ing for the increased amount of materials supplied but appar-
"'ir l •1 rlid not sign the second page calling for additional 
.a,ls of labor. The Plaintiffs/Appellants did not notice 
the same, until it was time to collect and there was a dispute. 
However, the Defendant Chapman said nothing about it 
at the time, and continued to induce the Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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'"" :ouant to the written contract, fully expecting to 
t lw odme on the Plaintiffs/Appellants after all of 
rl 1.1CJ.::> done. 
At the time of the said contract calling for the 
r'o'1mc>nC of $3,850.00, no work had been done. Defendant Chap-
·s1,Jn stated in his deoosition and in trial that he was aware 
that the Plaintiffs/Appellants were expecting to be paid the 
full $3,850.00 for his labor, as the document stated, but 
he Chapman, remained silent about his wanting the same done 
for $2,500.00, and expressly stated that he was going to 
the matter up, only after the work had been done. 
Quite apparently, the jury could see through the 
dishonesty in the same, just as the Defendants/Respondents 
were trying to avoid a just debt, by denying the arrange-
ments with the Plaintiffs/Appellants to act as his own con-
tractor and have them work for him. Then when all of the 
work was done, Defendants/Respondents could claim that they 
dict not know and hence, get something for nothing, and 
use the licensing statute as "an unwarranted shield for the 
avoidance of a just obligation." Note Whipple vs. Fuller, 
29Y P,2d 837, Utah, 1956, at pages 838 and 839. 
ARG1JMENT THREE 
Defendants/Respondents suggest on page 5 of their 
"•r1P[ that the major complaint with the Plaintiffs/Appellants 
•'', 11ol the fact that the latter was not licensed but was 
because of the improDer construction. 
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I Jo page 5, is the following: 
Contrary to the statement made by Plaintiffs 
it1 !heir Brief, Defendants Answer and Counterclaim 
is not premised solely on the fact that Plaintiffs 
were unlicensed, but primarily because of improper 
construction (R-ll, 012, 013, 014, 015 and 106)." 
Defendants/Respondents seem to be overlooking the 
Special Verdict Instruction #2, which was drafted into the 
said instructions at his insistance, which states: 
(2) Do you find that the Plaintiff materially 
complied with the plans, labor contract, material 
contract, and mutually agreed to changes made by 
the Plaintiff and the Defendant? 
ANSWER YES NO 
If it is Defendants/Respondents position that the 
Honorable Homer Wilkinson, District Judge, granted the Directed 
Verdict because the Plaintiffs/Appellants fell short of "materi·-
ally complying with the plans, labor contract, material contract, 
and mutually agreed to changes made by the Plaintiff and the 
Defendant," then the Court was clearly out of line. Note Efco 
Distributing, Inc., vs. 17 U 2d 375, 412 375, 
Utah, (1966). 
It is most critical to note the exhibits at this 
point to consider what was required of the Plaintiffs/Appellants. In 
doing so, Plaintiffs/Appellants suggest that they are flagrantly 
The plans and specifications drawn by the 
"',_hi Leet, employed by the Defendants/Respondents, have differing 
di.rnPnsions on the foundation, and the supports underneath the 
-4-
,1 , beginning with the foundation all of the way up 
, I" , ab in to the roof, there are inconsistent provisions 
i in:o and specifications. 
Now, as well as then, for the Defendants/Respondents 
that because the Plaintiffs/Appellants did not 
c"01pl\1 with all of the plans and specifications, is absurd. 
Jhev could not, as a logical impossibility. Much like a 
married bachelor, a round triangle, it just could not happen. 
However, the jury ended the matter for the parties. 
The jury said that the Plaintiffs/Appellants did in fact 
so comply, and from that point on it was not for the Court to 
substitute its judgment for the jury, Appellants/Plaintiffs 
respectfully submit. 
ARGUMENT FOUR 
The Defendants/Respondents suggest that the Plaintiffs/ 
Appellants were listed on the building permit as the contractor 
as evidence that that is exactly what he claimed to be. 
On page 10, of the Defendants/Respondents brief, is 
the following: 
The evidence additionally shows that Plaintiff 
Kerry R. Hubble, was listed as the contractor on the 
building permit (See Exhibit 28-D). . " 
Defendants/Respondents failed to tell the Court, 
however, that Mr. Hubble did not take out or apply for the 
i'enn1 r , nor did he know that Mr. Chapman, when he took out 
'1,,. said application for a building permit, had put the same 
rm the application. 
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As noted in 58-23-1, Utah Code Annotated, it is the 
, I·,, rakes out the permit, not necessarily what one writes 
, 1,, ·;,;id application for the same, that is controlling. 
Mr. Chapman took out the permit, and that ends it. 
Hence, he was the owner/contractor of the cabin, employing 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, along with their crews. 
ARGUMENT FIVE 
Defendants/Respondents suggest that Mr. Chapman was 
totally inexperienced in construction both of the following 
reasons: (1) that he was in the class of individuals to be 
protected by the licensing statute, and (2) that he could 
not be the owner/contractor for the building of his own 
cabin. 
Note page 4 of the Defendants/Respondents brief 
and specifically page 12 wherein it states: 
" ... There is no question that defendants were 
without any knowledge in the field of construction, 
and therefore, were the exact type of individuals 
to which the laws was enacted to protect ... " 
However, Plaintiffs/Appellants suggest that the 
facts of this case are exactly the opposite, hence the matter 
should have been submitted to the trier of fact, ie: the jury. 
According to the exhibits, the Defendants/Respondents 
employed their loved-one, who was an architect to help them 
with this project. 
In addition, the Defendants/Respondents, were going 
i 1 <Jf lhe additional work on this cabin, outside 
.-1nrk, which Mr. Chapman could not do because of 
Hence, the Defendants/Respondents, were going to 
do al I of the plumbing, electrical, shingles, water proof-
in3, insulating, all interior work, etc. So as a result, 
for the Defendants/Respondents to suggest that "there is no 
that the Defendants were without knowledge in the 
field of construction and were the exact type of individuals 
to which the law was enacted to protect . . . " could not be 
furtber from the truth. 
Plaintiffs/Appellants question the same, and so the 
matter should have been submitted to the trier of fact, the 
jury in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The jury heard all of the evidence. The parties 
were fully and fairly allowed to present their respective 
positions to the trier of fact, and the result of the same 
should not be tampered with, unless justice so requires. 
In the case of Berkeley Bank for Coops. vs. Meibos, 
Utah, 607 P.2d 789, (1980), the Utah Supreme Court referred 
to the age old law here in Utah, in the case of Campbell vs. 
S3fcway Stores, Inc, 15 U.2d 113, 117, 388 P.2d 409, 412, 
When the parties have had a full and fair opportunity 
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lo present their cause, and the jury has rendered 
ils verdict, it should not be interfered with unless 
there appears some compelling reason why justice 
Jemands that it be done. 
Plaintiffs/Appellants submit that in this case to 
set Lhe jury verdict aside is a gross injustice. It turns 
the licensing statute into "an unwarranted shield for the 
avoidance of a just oblip;ation." Whipple vs. Fuller, infra. 
Also note, Bigler vs. Mapleton Irrigation Canal Co. 
Utah, (1983) P.2d , Supreme Court opinion handed 
down on August 23, 1983: 
" ... we dispose of the second assignment of error 
first by adhering to well established standards of 
review. A jury verdict must stand unless there is 
no competent evidence to support it." 
Particularly when a jury makes a special verdict, 
this Court has consistently held that they should be upheld. 
In the case of Stanger vs. Centenial Life Insurance, 
Utah, (1983) Case No. 17757, handed down on August 11, 1983, 
this Court stated: 
In the special verdicts in favor of the 
plaintiffs, we will review the evidence in light 
most favorable to the findings of the jury, Williams 
vs. State Farm Ins. Co. 656 P.2d 966 (1982) and up-
hold them, so long as there is competent evidence 
to sustain them. Time Connnercial Financing Corp. 
vs. Davis, Utah, 657 P.2d 234 (1982) and cases 
therein cited. 
In this case, the jury was ?iven a special jury verdict 
'"' different is sues. One of the issues was the question of 
'.·1l1et her or not the work was completely done or supervised by 
o licensed contractor. 
Plaintiffs/Appellants submit that their determination 
-8-
,,1,1 ii<' dispositive of that issue. 
this factor coupled with the fact that this was a 
, , JP<'d home, purchased exclusively from the Plaintiffs/ 
,\pfJ"' l I ants, would mean that the only exposure that the 
Defendants/Respondents would have would be for labor per-
formed by the Plaintiffs/Appellants or their crews. 
This is not like the Defendants/Appellants hired 
the Plaintiffs/Appellants to do the work and buy the materials 
as they do the same, and then submit some big bill at the 
end. Rather this is a case where the homeowner purchased 
all of the materials and then engaged the Plaintiffs/Appellants 
to put the same together for them. 
Hence, they would have been in exactly the same posi-
tion, had the Plaintiffs/Appellants been licensed. Yet they 
have chosen not to pay the Plaintiffs/Appellants for their 
materials nor for the labor, and now stand before this Court 
requestin>; that the licensing statute be used as "an unwar-
ranted shield for the avoidance of a just obligation. 
1983. 
Respectfully submitted this 12th day of December, 
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